In the aftermath of the U.S. …nancial crisis, both a sharp drop in employment and a surge in corporate cash have been observed. In this paper, based on U.S. data, we document that the negative relationship between the corporate cash ratio and employment is systematic, both over time and across …rms. We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model where heterogenous …rms need cash in their production process. We analyze the dynamic impact of aggregate shocks and the cross-…rm impact of idiosyncratic shocks. We show that liquidity and productivity shocks tend to generate a negative comovement between the cash ratio and employment. In contrast, standard credit shocks produce a positive relationship. A calibrated version of the model yields a negative comovement that is close to the data.
Introduction
In the aftermath of the U.S. …nancial crisis, both a sharp decline in employment and an accumulation of cash held by …rms have been observed. While both variables are part of …rms'decisions, they are typically not considered jointly in the literature. To what extent are these two features related? Holding liquid assets facilitates the …rm's ability to pay for the wage bill. But employment and cash decisions also react to changes in …rms environment, e.g., changes in credit conditions. Therefore, examining these two variables jointly sheds light on the role of …nancial frictions on employment, especially during the crisis. It also provides crucial information on …rms'behavior and on their response to shocks. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it provides stylized facts on the relationship between the corporate cash position and employment. Second, it delivers an explanation to the empirical evidence by building a tractable dynamic general equilibrium framework, including both cash and employment decisions.
We …rst document a robust negative comovement between the corporate cash ratio and employment on U.S. data, which is not speci…c to the recent …nancial crisis. Using Flow-of-Funds data over the period 1980-2011, the correlation between HP-…ltered employment and the share of liquid assets in total assets is 0:52. Moreover, using …rm-level data from Compustat, the annual cross-…rm correlation between employment and the cash ratio is on average 0:29 over the same period. Section 2 provides a detailed description of this data analysis.
To understand the optimal cash and employment decisions, we consider an in…nite-horizon general equilibrium model with heterogeneous …rms that need liquid funds in their production process. Liquidity is closely related to labor because …rms have liquidity needs in order to …nance the wage bill, which is part of working capital. We adopt a structure similar to Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995) , who divide periods in two subperiods. In the …rst subperiod, …rms use credit to install capital, while they need liquid funds to pay workers in the second subperiod. 1 In contrast to the literature introducing working capital in macroeconomic models (see Christiano et al. 2011 , for a survey), we assume that …rms do not have full access to external liquidity and cannot borrow all their short-term needs. This generates a demand for cash. Liquidity that is external to the …rm may take several forms, such as credit lines, trade credits, trade receivables to customers, or late wage payments. Liquidity shocks are changes in the availability of external liquidity. We assume that …rms may be hit by technology shocks, by changes in their ability to obtain long-term credit (i.e., standard credit shocks) and by liquidity shocks. These shocks can be at the aggregate or at the idiosyncratic level.
The model is designed to be tractable so that several results can be derived analytically. It suggests that both aggregate technology and liquidity shocks can explain the negative comovement between employment and the corporate cash ratio. For example, a reduction in external liquidity generates two e¤ects. On the one hand, lower liquidity reduces the …nancial opportunities of …rms and depresses labor demand. On the other hand, the reduction in external liquidity makes the production process more intensive in cash to ensure that wages are fully …nanced. Firms assets are then tilted towards cash. Combining these two e¤ects implies that the cash ratio increases while employment declines. On the contrary, a standard credit shock generates a positive comovement between the two variables. This analysis points out the crucial role played by the tightening of liquidity conditions in the aftermath of the Lehman crisis. While no initial sharp reduction in credit supply was observed during the recent …nancial crisis, …rms experienced a significant deterioration in their expected liquidity conditions. For example, Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012) argue that banks cut the existing corporate lines of credits during the crisis. 2 Also, short-term loans to business …rms decreased by 9% between 2008 and 2009 (using Survey of Terms of Business Lending, maturity of less than 30 days) while the liquidity ratio sharply increased from 3.9% to 5%. Since our analysis focuses on portfolio decisions between liquid and less liquid assets, it is natural to consider the cash ratio rather than the level of cash. The cash ratio is mainly driven by the availability of external liquid funds. Therefore, the liquidity shock mentioned above drives the comovement between the cash ratio and employment in an unambiguous way, unlike the level of cash. Indeed, the reduction in labor demand depresses the demand for cash per se through a "size e¤ect": since cash is used to …nance the wage bill, a lower labor demand implies a lower demand for cash. This negative size e¤ect then interacts with the positive "portfolio e¤ect"described above.
Idiosyncratic shocks generate heterogeneity among …rms regarding their cash holding and employment decisions. The model is parametrized using moments distribution from …rm-level data. Despite its simplicity, the model performs relatively well quantitatively to reproduce the negative cross-…rm correlation between the cash ratio and employment. Our benchmark calibration gives a correlation of 0:18, while it is 0:29 in the data. The optimal choice of corporate liquidity is rarely introduced in macroeconomic models, even in models with …nancial frictions. When it is, the focus is on investment, not labor. Liquid assets are usually held by households, typically in the form of money, to …nance their consumption. 3 However, …rms also have liquidity needs.
Papers incorporating …rms'liquidity are typically in the spirit of Holmstrom and Tirole (2011) and Woodford (1990) While the link between liquidity and employment has not received much attention so far, our analysis is related to several strands of the literature. First, there is a growing literature that incorporates …rms'…nancial frictions in a macroeconomic context. For instance, Covas and den Haan (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) analyze corporate external …nance decisions over the business cycle, such as debt and equity. However, these papers do not introduce cash. For example, in their theoretical model, Jermann and Quadrini (2012) have working capital that is fully …nanced by an intra-period loan. Other papers focus more closely on the relationship between …nancial factors and the labor market. This literature stresses the role of …nancial frictions in ‡uencing labor demand. 4 Most of these papers provide a more detailed analysis of the labor market than we do, but they do not consider cash holdings. Our analysis focuses on the impact of liquidity conditions on labor demand. Our paper is also related to a vast theoretical literature in corporate …nance on …rms'cash holdings and corporate saving. Our approach shares features with several recent papers that provide analyses at the …rm level or in environments with heterogeneous …rms. Some papers are particularly close to our approach as they focus on the role of …nancing conditions. 5;6 Our paper di¤ers from this literature by focusing on employment which plays a key role in the working capital management. In addition, we provide a general equilibrium analysis which is important in the context of employment as this is an input that is not generated by the …rm (in contrast to capital). As a result, market-clearing wage ‡uctuations can potentially o¤set partial equilibrium e¤ects. This is particularly relevant in the context of liquidity management as the wage bill a¤ects …rms'liquidity needs.
Another di¤erence is that we make a clear distinction between liquid and less liquid assets. The recent dynamic models in the corporate …nance literature consider cash a negative debt or as a residual between cash ‡ow and investment. 7 Finally, our approach is consistent with the …ndings of the empirical literature on the determinants of corporate cash. 8 This literature stresses in particular the precautionary motive to save cash and shows that this motive increases with cash ‡ow uncertainty or with more uncertain access to capital markets (see for instance 5 For example, Eisfeldt and Muir (2013) develop a partial equilibrium model, examining both the aggregate corporate sector and the distribution of heterogeneous …rms, to analyze the positive relationship between external …nance and cash accumulation (in contrast to cash holding). They argue that changes in the cost of external …nance drives internal and external funds hoarding in the same direction. Bolton et al. (2013) and Hugonnier et al. (2013) show that worsening external funding conditions increase cash holdings and decrease investment. Falato et al. (2013) explain this increase by a reduction of tangible capital that can be used as collateral for …rms' borrowing. Finally, the explanation given by Gao (2013) relies on the increased use of just-in-time production techniques, which increase the need for liquid funding. 6 Some papers consider other determinants of …rms'cash holdings. Boileau and Moyen (2012) analyze the e¤ect of funding risk on corporate liquidity by making the distinction between credit lines usage and cash. Armenter and Hnatkovska (2011) develop a model to explain the gradual increase in corporate net saving. They show that …rms have been relying more on internal funds for precautionary motives and because of tax reforms. 7 This contrasts with an older corporate …nance literature, see Holmstrom and Tirole (2011 Lins et al. (2010) show that internal cash is used more in bad times while …rms are more likely to use credit lines in good times. Acharya et al. (2013) build a model to show that …rms would rather use credit lines instead of cash reserve when they face a low aggregate risk.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the negative comovement between corporate cash and employment. Section 3 presents the model and shows the basic mechanism that can lead to this negative relationship. In Section 4, we calibrate the model to analyze the dynamic impact of aggregate shocks. In Section 5, we examine the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on cross…rm correlations. Section 6 discusses various extensions and Section 7 concludes. Several results are derived in the Appendices.
Stylized Facts
In this section, we document the negative correlation in the U.S. between the corporate cash ratio and employment, both in aggregate terms and at the …rm level. We …rst illustrate the aggregate correlation between corporate cash and employment over the business cycle. We use annual data in the non-farm non-…nancial corporate sector. The cash ratio, de…ned as the share of corporate liquidity to total assets, is built from the Flow-of-Funds of the United States. We de…ne cash as the sum of private foreign deposits, checkable deposits and currency, total time and savings deposits and money market mutual fund shares. Corporate employment in logarithm is drawn from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The upper panel in Figure  1 displays the HP-…ltered component of employment and the cash ratio over the sample 1980-2011.
[ insert Figure 1 here ]
We clearly observe a negative comovement between the two variables. This negative relationship is particularly striking during the Great Recession since the corporate liquidity ratio experienced a large boom between 2007 and 2009 while employment has been strongly depressed. Taking the 1980-2011 sample, the contemporaneous correlation between employment and the cash ratio is strongly negative ( 0:52) and signi…cant at 1%. 10 We show below that this is consistent with productivity and liquidity shocks in our model. While our analysis focuses on the cash ratio and on portfolio e¤ects, it is useful 10 In order to avoid any spurious correlation, we also compute the correlation when cash is divided by the one-year lagged value of total assets instead of its current value. The correlation is still negative ( 0:33) and signi…cant. The correlation on quarterly data and by excluding the Great Recession is lower ( 0:20) but still signi…cant at 5%. Robustness exercises are provided in the online appendix.
to examine the evolution of the level of cash. The lower panel in Figure 1 displays the cyclical component of employment and the in ‡ation-adjusted level of cash over the same period. Interestingly, while the correlation between the cash ratio and employment is signi…cantly negative, the correlation between the cash level and employment is low (-0.09) and insigni…cant. This di¤erence is consistent with our model. While the dynamics of the cash ratio are driven by a pure portfolio e¤ect, the cash level results from the combination of a portfolio e¤ect and a size e¤ect, making its dynamics more ambiguous. Namely, when the production process is more intensive in cash (portfolio e¤ect), employment and thus the production scale typically decrease (size e¤ect), which also means that less cash is needed. The implications for the level of cash are therefore ambiguous. We argue below that this zero correlation is consistent with a combination of technology and liquidity shocks which a¤ect the level of cash in opposite ways.
The aggregate correlations that have been documented are driven by macroeconomic shocks common to all …rms. In order to capture the heterogeneity among …rms, we assess the correlation between the corporate cash ratio and employment using disaggregated …rm-level data from Compustat. The sample contains US non…nancial …rms from 1980 to 2011. We focus only on …rms that are active during the whole period, which allows us to have a homogeneous panel. In addition, we drop the 10% largest …rms. This is a standard procedure (e.g., see Covas and den Haan, 2011) as the largest …rms may have a speci…c behavior. For example, the cash holding of multinational companies might be driven by foreign tax incentives (see Foley et al., 2007) . We also exclude …nancial and utilities …rms, …rms which are not incorporated in the US market and those engaged in major mergers. 11 This is justi…ed by the fact that part of the stock of cash holding is a¤ected by acquisition. We also drop all …rms with negative or missing values for: total assets, sales, cash and employees. 12 We use the number of employees per …rm (Compustat data item #29) as our measure of employment. The corporate cash ratio is de…ned as the ratio between cash and short term investment (Compustat data item #1) and the book value of assets (Compustat data item #6). A …rm-speci…c linear trend is removed from both employment and the cash ratio. Figure 2 plots the year-by-year cross-…rm correlation coe¢ cients between these two variables with their signi…cance level.
[ insert Figure 2 here ]
Over the period, the cross-section correlation between detrended employment and cash ratio is 0:29 on average and it is signi…cant at 1%. The negative correlation is signi…cant in all periods and is lower than average during the Great Recession.
While we only present unconditional correlations, the negative relationship between employment and cash holding is robust when we use OLS with …rms-…xed e¤ects, years-…xed e¤ects, and standard control variables (see online appendix). In particular, this relationship is not driven only by macroeconomic shocks or by systematic di¤erences across …rms. Our model also accounts for this idiosyncratic correlation. An important assumption of our model is that cash holding decisions are determined by the …nancing of the wage bill. This explanation suggests that there should be a relationship between the level of cash held by …rms and their labor share. Figure 3 con…rms this view by displaying the aggregate cash ratio of …rms classi…ed into two groups: those with a labor share below the median and those with a labor share above the median. 13 [ insert Figure 3 here ]
In this paper, we argue that the demand for cash and employment are driven by future prospects about the availability of external liquidity and productivity. There are alternative potential explanations of the negative correlation between the cash ratio and employment. First, the demand for cash can be driven by the cyclicality in the cost of cash. For example, during the crisis, the ‡ight to liquidity can be explained by the drop in interest rates which decreased the opportunity cost of cash. However, the negative correlation is robust to the inclusion of years-…xed e¤ects, which indicates that it is not driven exclusively by business cycle e¤ects like the cost of cash. A second alternative explanation emphasizes the role of unexpected shocks. For example, following a negative unexpected productivity shock, …rms 13 The labor share of …rms is industry-speci…c. We use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. For each industry, we compute the labor share by year, de…ned as the ratio between payroll and production. Then, using our Compustat dataset, we attribute to each manufacturing …rm the value of the labor share associated to its industry. Firms with a labor share below (above) the median are "low (high) labor-share …rms". We compute the average value of the cash ratio by class and by year. lay o¤ workers, which generates more cash ‡ow. However, using our panel of …rms from Compustat, we show that the correlation coe¢ cient remains negative and signi…cant when we control for cash ‡ows (see online appendix). Moreover, the correlation coe¢ cient is still negative and signi…cant when we use the lagged cash ratio and when we control for the size of the …rm (see online appendix). These two pieces of evidence suggest that the correlation between employment and the cash ratio is not driven solely by unexpected shocks.
A Dynamic Model of Corporate Cash Holdings
The single-good economy is inhabited by in…nitely-lived heterogeneous entrepreneurs and identical households. Entrepreneurs produce, hire labor, invest, borrow, and hold cash. Households work, consume, lend to entrepreneurs and also hold cash. We abstract from …nancial intermediaries. Liquidity is modeled by dividing each period in two subperiods, which we refer to as beginning-of-period and end-of-period. The market for less liquid assets, called bonds, only opens at the beginning-of-period. Firms have a liquidity need at the end-of-period as they have to pay for the wage bill.
14 This liquidity need can be covered either by external liquidity or by cash holdings. Therefore, the need for cash is a¤ected by changes in the availability of external liquidity. We …rst describe the problem of entrepreneurs and then turn to their optimal behavior, focusing on optimal labor demand and cash. We characterize analytically the properties of the model in this partial equilibrium. Finally, we describe the general equilibrium model by introducing households.
Entrepreneurs
There is a continuum of entrepreneurs of length 1. Entrepreneur i 2 [0; 1] maximizes:
where c it+s is the consumption of entrepreneur i in period t + s. Entrepreneur i produces Y it out of capital K it and labor l it through the production function
where F is a standard constant-return-to-scale production function and A it is total factor productivity (TFP). In this section, we assume full capital stock depreciation within a period. TFP is composed of an aggregate component and an idiosyncratic one:
where A t follows an AR(1) process and A it follows a Markov process, with E(A t ) = A and
Entrepreneurs enter beginning-of-period t with initial income it and can borrow in illiquid bonds D it to pay for their consumption, their capital, and cash M it . Bonds D it are illiquid in the sense that they can only be traded at begining-ofperiod. They yield a gross interest rate r t , while cash bears no interest. Their beginning-of-period budget constraint is:
The cash ratio m it is de…ned as the proportion of cash to total assets, i.e., m it M it =(K it + M it ). As D it is never negative in equilibrium, it is never part of gross assets. 15 Initial income is made of output and unused cash minus the gross interest rate payment on bonds and the cost associated with external liquidity used in the previous subperiod:
where f M it 1 is unused cash, L it 1 is external liquidity obtained in the previous end-of-period and 1 is the cost associated with it. Liquidity shocks a¤ect the magnitude of external liquidity L it available to …rms. At end-of-period t, …rms need to pay for wages out of their cash or any liquid funds they obtain in that subperiod. They face the following liquidity constraint:
where w t is the wage rate. Unused cash is simply de…ned as f M it = M it L it w t l it . It will be equal to zero in most of our analysis. Liquid funds L it are assumed to be limited to a proportion it of current output, i.e.,
If r > , then typically L it = it Y it , which we will assume. Shocks to it are therefore liquidity shocks, i.e., shocks that a¤ect the amount of external liquidity. External liquidity can take several forms. If it is made only of short-term borrowing, total liquidity needs are equal to the wage bill w t l it and L it = it Y it represents a short-term credit limit justi…ed by standard moral hazard mechanisms. A shock to it corresponds to a change in short-term credit conditions and the cost 1 then represents the gross interest rate on short-term loans. Alternatively, shocks to it could also represent shocks to liquidity provided by customers. Assume that L it represent early sales: the …rm could sell a proportion it of its output at end-ofperiod t, while the rest is sold at beginning-of-period t + 1. This could correspond to the trade receivables made by the …rm to the customers. In that case, the liquidity need is w t l it it Y it . Sales in the next subperiod are then (1 it )Y it so that = 1.
16 External liquidity could also vary with the proportion of wages that have to be paid at end-of-period. Therefore, it captures di¤erent forms of external liquidity that will a¤ect in the same way the demand for cash holdings. The liquidity shock it is assumed to be composed of an aggregate component and an idiosyncratic one:
where t follows an AR(1) process and it follows a Markov process, with E( t ) = and
In our benchmark analysis, we simply assume that it is known at beggining-of-period t. Assuming that the liquidity shock is anticipated is a convenient way of capturing the perceived availability of liquidity. More generally, we can think of expected changes in the distribution of it . In Section 6, we show that anticipated changes in the variance of it can have the same e¤ect.
Finally, we assume that the entrepreneur faces a standard credit constraint at beginning-of-period t. Due to standard moral hazard arguments, a fraction 0 it 1 of production has to be used as collateral for bond repayments:
The parameter it is composed of an aggregate component and a …rm-speci…c one:
where t follows an AR (1) process with E( t ) = and R 1 0 i di = 0. In this paper, we make the distinction between a standard credit shock, it , and a liquidity shock, it . The former can be viewed as a standard disturbance on the banking sector since it a¤ects the long-term credit. The latter corresponds to an exogenous change in the availability of external liquid funds, which may come from di¤erent sources.
Optimal Cash Holding and Employment
Entrepreneurs maximize (1) subject to (3), (5) and (8) . The optimization of the entrepreneur is described in details in Appendix A. We assume that shocks are anticipated so the random variables A it , it and it are known at beginning-ofperiod t. As cash does not yield any interest, one can also verify that (5) is always binding so that f M it = 0. It is convenient to express production as a function of the capital-labor ratio
, the optimality conditions with respect to l it and K it imply a constant capital-labor ratio across …rms such that (see Appendix A):
where k(w t ) = w t =(1 ). More generally, we would have k it = A it k(w t =A it ) (see Appendix A). In this section, we consider the Cobb-Douglas case. The more general CES case is treated in Section 6.
The cash ratio, which is a key variable in our analysis because it re ‡ects the cash-intensity of production, can be derived from the above results. Using (5), (10) , and L it = it Y it , we …nd:
The demand for cash per unit of capital is equal to the demand of cash per unit of labor, divided by the capital-labor ratio. The demand for cash per unit of labor is itself simply equal to the liquidity need per unit of labor (w t ), minus external liquidity per unit of labor ( it A it f (k t )). Equation (11) implies that the cash ratio, which depends solely on M it =K it , decreases with it and A it . The reason is that both higher it and A it imply smaller liquidity needs at end-of-period t.
To analyze labor demand, we will focus on cases where entrepreneurs are creditconstrained and have log utility. Appendix A shows that the credit constraint is binding whenever the wage paid by …rms, w t , is lower than the marginal return of labor, denoted w it . With a Cobb-Douglas production function, we …nd that
. Moreover, with log utility Appendix A shows that optimal consumption is c it = (1 ) it . In that case, it is useful to rewrite the constraint (3) using (5), (8) , and L it = it Y it : This gives:
Equation (12) gives the budget constraint aggregated over the two subperiods. Total …nancing of …rms, on the left-hand side, pays for inputs, on the right-hand side. Both the long-term and short-term …nancing conditions, represented respectively by it and it , a¤ect the capacity of …rms to …nance labor l it . Using (12), the optimal behavior of entrepreneurs is described in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Individual policy functions) Suppose that u(c it ) = ln(c it ) and
, where k t is given by (10) , then the liquidity constraint (5) and the credit constraints (6) and (8) are binding and the policy functions for K it , M it , l it , D it ;and it+1 satisfy:
where
Proof. See Appendix A. We call Z it the …nancial multiplier. It measures the impact of a change in income on labor demand. Notice that a decline in the …nancing conditions it or it implies a smaller Z it . This is actually the only channel through which it a¤ects the policy functions of assets so that M it and K it move proportionately in the same direction and the cash ratio remains una¤ected. In contrast, a change in it a¤ects both the …nancial multiplier and the relative need for cash, thereby leading to a negative relation between the cash ratio and employment. These e¤ects give the main insight from the results in Proposition 1 and are given in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Ceteris paribus, …rms with lower liquidity it or lower productivity A it have lower employment l it and a higher cash ratio m it . Moreover, it a¤ects negatively employment l it but has no e¤ect on the cash ratio m it .
Proof. From (13)- (15) it is easy to see that M it =K it is decreasing in it and A it , while l it is increasing in it and A it . Similarly, M it =K it is invariant in it while the …nancial accelerator Z it , hence l it , is increasing in it .
Corollary 1 illustrates the main mechanism in the model. An expected decrease in it implies a smaller amount of available liquid funds at end-of-period t. As a response, …rms naturally increase the proportion of cash in their portfolio, as seen in (11) . At the same time, they reduce their labor demand and their production, as outside funding decreases. This can be easily seen from (12) . The same occurs with a decline in productivity A it , since lower productivity also implies lower liquid funds at the end-of-period. In contrast, changes in the credit constraint it do not have a direct impact on m it since they only a¤ect long-term credit. Indeed, it a¤ects the scale of production through the …nancial multiplier Z it but does not a¤ect the structure of the portfolio between liquid and illiquid assets. Therefore, it could not explain the negative relationship between the cash ratio and employment. However, the degree of the credit constraint a¤ects the response of l it to shocks.
The results can be even starker when we consider the level of cash rather than the cash ratio, as shown in the following corollary.
Corollary 2 If r t k t > it A it f (k t ), then, ceteris paribus, …rms with lower liquidity it or lower productivity A it have higher cash holdings M it , while …rms with lower it have lower cash holdings.
Proof. From (13)- (15) it is easy to see that M it is decreasing in it and A it , as long as r t k t > A it f (k t ). Similarly, since Z it is decreasing in it , then l it is decreasing in it .
A lower it leaves the cash ratio unchanged, but reduces the scale of production through the …nancial accelerator Z it . Since cash is used in the production process, this reduces the level of cash. This is a "size" e¤ect. Lower it and A it also reduce the scale of production through the …nancial multiplier, but they also make the production process more intensive in cash through the cash ratio. This is a "portfolio"e¤ect. If r t k t > it A it f (k t ) , the portfolio e¤ect dominates and the level of cash increases.
The next two sections verify numerically the ceteris paribus result from Corollaries 1 and 2 in a dynamic model where the income level it is endogenous and the wage rate w t is determined in the labor market. Section 4 focuses on aggregate shocks and the time-series dimension, while Section 5 focuses on the cross-…rm dimension.
Closing the Model
The model is closed by introducing households. Since the emphasis is on …rms, households are modeled in a simple way and the full description is left for Appendix B. Identical households provide an in…nitely elastic supply funds D t to …rms at interest rate r = 1= h , where h is the households'discount factor. This is justi…ed by a utility function linear in consumption and the absence of …nancial frictions. We assume that h . Similarly, we assume that households'utility is linear in cash so that their supply of cash is in…nitely elastic at rate 1.
Households have a labor supply l s (w t ) that depends positively on the wage rate.
In our speci…cation, we have l s (w t ) = (w t = w) where > 0 is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and w is a positive constant (see Appendix B). The wage rate is then determined endogenously so that l s (w t ) = R 1 0 l it di where l it is the labor demand by …rm i in period t. According to Proposition 1, l it = l(w t ; A it ; it ; it ; it ), so the equilibrium wage is de…ned by
At end-of-period t households also supply liquid funds L t at rate , where 1 is a sunk cost incurred by households when providing external liquidity. They always have su¢ cient cash since they receive their wages at end-of-period t while they consume at beginning-of-period t + 1. As mentioned above, these liquid funds can take di¤erent forms such as early purchases or short term credit.
Aggregate Shocks
In this section, we focus on the time-series dimension, as described in Figure 1 , of the relationship between the cash ratio and employment. For this purpose, we assume that all entrepreneurs are identical and only face aggregate shocks, so A it = it = i = 0. We also assume that entrepreneurs are always constrained by setting < h . In this context, we calibrate the model to analyze the dynamic impact of three relevant shocks: liquidity shocks t , productivity shocks A t , and standard credit shocks t . We show that our model generates a negative comovement between cash and labor in the presence of liquidity and productivity shocks, but not with standard credit shocks.
Equilibrium
In the absence of idiosyncratic shocks, the only potential source of heterogeneity between …rms is their wealth. Since labor demand is linear in wealth, we can then write R 1 0 l(w t ; A t ; t ; t ; it )di = l(w t ; A t ; t ; t ; t ) where t = R 1 0 it di. We consider a constrained equilibrium in the Cobb-Douglas case de…ned as follows:
De…nition 1 (Constrained equilibrium under aggr. shocks only, Cobb-Douglas case) For a given aggregate wealth t and a given realization of A t , t and t , a constrained period-t equilibrium is a level of employment l t , of capital K t , of cash M t , of debt D t , of …nancial multiplier Z t and of future wealth t+1 satisfying Equations (13) to (18) , where r t = 1= h , the wage w t clears the labor market so that l s (w t ) = l(w t ; A t ; t ; t ; t ) with l s (w t ) = (w t = w) and k t is the corresponding capital-labor ratio given by Equation (10) . Finally, the equilibrium wage must satisfy w t < w t .
Since the aggregate labor demand depends on A t , t , t and t , the equilibrium wage also depends on those variables: w t = w(A t ; t ; t ; t ). For an individual …rm, we saw that the credit constraint is binding whenever w t < w it . At the aggregate level, we can show that there exists an increasing function (A t ; t ; t ) so that w t < w t is equivalent to t < . When the wage is low, …rms want to use all their resources to produce. However, because …rms'resources are limited by the credit constraints, the aggregate labour demand is low when the aggregate wealth is low, which maintains the equilibrium wage at a low level and …rms are constrained in equilibrium. In this section, we focus on cases where this condition is satis…ed and we discuss the case where …rms are unconstrained in Section 6. The following Proposition shows under which conditions the steady state is constrained:
Proposition 2 (Constrained steady state under aggregate shocks only) The steady state is constrained if and only if < h .
Proof. See Appendix C.
Individual agents and the aggregate economy will ‡uctuate around a constrained steady state. Intuitively, on the one hand, a wage that is lower than the marginal productivity of labor makes the credit constraint binding, as stated in Proposition 1. On the other hand, the credit constraint makes the equilibrium wage dependent on aggregate wealth. When < h , the net interest rate 1= h 1 is below the propensity to consume out of wealth 1= 1, so …rms never accumulate su¢ cient wealth to be able to provide an equilibrium wage equal to marginal productivity. Table 1 shows the calibration used for the parameters. The …rst …ve parameters are calibrated on standard values. Firms'discount factor equals = 0:97 while the one for households'is set to h = =0:99. Consequently, the steady-state annualized real interest rate is 2%. The Frisch parameter, , is set to unity. 18 We set the share of capital in production, , to 0:36. We assume that the cost of using liquidity, , is lower than the gross interest rate, such that = 1:01. 19 The other parameters are calibrated to match key empirical targets, using the Compustat database described in Section 2. The liquidity parameter is set to 0:59 in order to match the mean of the cash ratio which equals 11% over the sample. 20 In addition, the proportion of output to be collateralized is set to (0:32 r) to match the average debt-to-sales ratio of 0:32. 21 Finally, we normalize A to unity. The autoregressive parameter of the AR(1) process for t , t and A t is set to 0:95.
Calibration
[ insert Table 1 here ]
Impulse Response Functions
We examine the impact of a 0.1 percent decrease in aggregate liquidity, technology and credit from their steady-state level. The impulse response functions are computed by determining the equilibrium wage, w t , that clears the labor market and using in turn the policy functions (13) to (17).
[ insert Figures 4-5-6 here ]
Liquidity Shock Figure 4 shows the case of a negative liquidity shock, i.e., a decline in t . This shock implies that …rms have smaller external liquid funds to pay for wage bills at end-of-period. On the one hand, …rms need to adjust their portfolio by increasing their cash ratio m t at beginning-of-period. On the other hand, as the …nancing conditions deteriorate, the …rm has to reduce its size, implying that both employment l t and wages w t decline. However, this size e¤ect is dominated by the portfolio e¤ect, which implies that the level of cash M t increases. The need for cash decreases over time as t returns to its initial value. In addition, 18 The online appendix shows that the dynamics are slightly a¤ected by the calibration of this parameter. 19 This assumption is needed for credit lines to be attractive. In reality, the rate on short-term credit lines is typically higher. But the borrowing period is shorter so that the actual borrowing cost is typically lower. 20 The online appendix shows that our results are robust to the calibration of this parameter. 21 We de…ne debt as the sum of long-term debt (Compustat data item #9) and debt in current liabilities (Compustat data item #34). Sales correspond to Compustat data item #117. 22 We check that we do have w t < w t every period.
less attractive production conditions also imply a decline in investment K t and in debt D t . The equilibrium decline in wage causes an initial increase in …rms'income Productivity Shock Figure 5 shows the impact of a decline in productivity A t .
One of the e¤ects of this decline is to decrease the amount of external liquid funds available at end-of-period. This e¤ect dominates on impact and implies an increase in both the cash ratio and -to a lesser extent -the cash level. The other, more standard, e¤ect is to decrease production through a tighter …nancial multiplier. This implies a decline in investment, labor demand, wages and debt. Lower inputs and lower productivity both generate a lower production. Lower production in turn implies a smaller need for cash in subsequent periods. This size e¤ect dominates the portfolio e¤ect, generating a drop in the level of cash, even though the cash ratio remains high. As discussed above, the size and the portfolio e¤ects a¤ect the level of internal liquidity in opposite ways (see Equation 15 ). Therefore, the comovement between the level of cash and employment depends on the relative importance of these two e¤ects. We observe that a liquidity shock generates a negative comovement between the two variables, while a technology shock generates a positive comovement (except on impact), because the portfolio e¤ect dominates in the former case while the size e¤ect dominates in the latter. Therefore, the combination of the two shocks induces an ambiguous e¤ect on the relationship between the level of cash and employment. In contrast, the cash ratio is exclusively driven by the portfolio e¤ect in response to these two shocks (see Equation 11 ), implying a negative comovement with employment. This result is in line with the empirical evidence stressed in Section 2 and illustrated in Figure 1 . Figure 6 describes the response to a negative credit shock t . Lower borrowing at beginning-of-period implies lower investment and lower labor demand. Cash holdings decrease sharply, both because of the decrease in labor demand and of the lower need for liquidity per unit of labor due to a lower equilibrium wage. However, a lower debt increases internal funds so that investment and production can quickly recover. This leads to a quick recovery of labor demand and of cash. Overall, cash and employment are clearly positively correlated.
Credit Shock
The results in Figures 4 and 5 appear consistent with the aggregate evidence shown in Figure 1 . During the …nancial crisis, the negative comovement between cash and employment was particularly pronounced, while the main shock was emanating from the …nancial sector. If we assume that the main shock was a liquidity shock t , the model indeed produces a strong negative relationship. Instead, if we assumed that the main shock was a standard credit shock t , we would observe a positive comovement. 23 In other words, the model is inconsistent with a credit shock being the main shock during the crisis, but is consistent with a liquidity shock. If we consider the period before the crisis, the negative comovement between the cash ratio and employment can be explained from our model by the combination of both technology and liquidity shocks. Interestingly, in all experiments, debt evolves in the same pattern as labor, which is in line with Covas and den Haan (2012) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012) who stress that debt is procyclical. As a result, the comovement between the cash ratio and debt exhibits the same pattern as the comovement between the cash ratio and labor. It is negative for liquidity and productivity shocks and positive for credit shocks. This is in line with the Flow-of-Funds data which suggest a negative correlation between the log of debt and the cash ratio (both HP-…ltered).
Cross-…rms Correlations
We now assess whether the calibrated model is able to explain the cross-…rm evidence of a negative correlation between cash and employment. To examine this issue, we reintroduce heterogeneous …rms that are hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks A it and liquidity shocks it . Instead we assume for simplicity that the aggregate economy does not ‡uctuate by setting A t = A, t = . As a benchmark, we assume that credit constraints do not vary across …rms and time and set it = . We relax this assumption later by assuming that …rms can have di¤erent levels of credit constraints.
Equilibrium
As in the case with aggregate shocks only, we consider a constrained equilibrium de…ned as follows:
De…nition 2 (Constrained equilibrium under idios. shocks only, Cobb-Douglas case) For a given period-t distribution of wealth, productivity and liquidity f it ; A it ; it g i2[0;1] , a constrained period-t equilibrium is given by the …rm-speci…c levels of employment l it , of capital K it , of cash M it , of debt D it , of Z it and of future wealth it+1 satisfying Equations (13) to (18), where r t = 1= h , the wage w t clears the labor market such that (19) is satis…ed with l s (w t ) = (w t = w) and k t is the corresponding capital-labor ratio given by Equation (10) . Finally, the equilibrium wage must satisfy w t < w it for all i 2 [0; 1].
In our simulation exercise, we check ex post that we do have w t < w it for all i.
Calibration
Beside the parameter values described in the previous section, we aim at calibrating a range for it = + it and A it = A + A it . We assume that these shocks can take 10 equidistant possible realizations. The two shocks are assumed to follow an independent …rst-order Markov process with transition probability of 0: 25 9 . More precisely, each …rm has a probability of 75% to stay in the same state for (A) and a probability of 25% to switch to one of the 9 other states, with an identical probability for each of these states. We calibrate the range for it and A it (namely, we set the minimum and maximum values) to match some distribution moments observed at the …rm level. Table 1 provides the interquartile values to match, computed from the Compustat database described in Section 2. The range of the idiosyncratic liquidity and productivity shocks it and A it are set to reproduce: (i) the interquartile range for the empirical cash ratio and (ii) the interquartile ratio for sales. This implies it 2 [0:55; 0:635] and A it 2 [0:988; 1]. All the other parameters are calibrated as described in Section 4.2. The numerical method to obtain the steady-state wage and distribution of …rms is described in Appendix D. Table 2 displays …rm-level moments computed from the stationary distribution. Interestingly, we observe that our calibrated model is able to reproduce the mean of the cash ratio observed in the data. In addition, the model does a good job in replicating the interquartile ratio of employment. Turning to the negative cross-…rm correlation between the cash ratio and employment the model provides a negative correlation of 0:18 under our benchmark calibration. This number is somewhat smaller than the precise number found in the data ( 0:29).
Results
[ insert Table 2 here ]
To understand this result, Figure 7 shows the impact of an idiosyncratic innovation of it and A it on the value of the labor normalized by wealth (`i t = it ) and the cash ratio (m it ), both weighted by the distribution probability.
[ insert Figure 7 here ] This …gure shows that, as it decreases, the cash ratio is higher and labor is lower for a given it . Similarly, …rms facing a negative productivity shock adjust their labor downward. At the same time, they enjoy lower liquidity ‡ows from their sales, which forces them to increase their cash ratio. Therefore, it appears that the cash ratio increases when A it decreases while labor decreases. Consequently, this …gure shows a negative relationship between the cash ratio and labor. Firms facing a negative liquidity shock are able to …nance less labor with the same amount of cash. To accommodate for this shock, they both accumulate more cash in order to pay for the wage bill and diminish their level of labor to limit the wage bill.
However, while the normalized labor (l it = it ) is independent of it according to Proposition 1, the level of labor l it is driven by the size of the …rm it , which depends on the history of shocks. As a consequence, the correlation between the cash ratio and labor is driven not only by A it and it as suggested by Figure 7 , but also by it . Table 3 complements the previous …gure by showing the weighted value of these variables by class of …rms.
[ insert Table 3 here ] While …rms with a level of wealth below median have on average a substantially lower level of employment than …rms with a level of wealth above median, their cash ratio is about the same on average. On the one hand, idiosyncratic innovations on liquidity ( ) and technology (A) have a direct e¤ect on the cash ratio and labor, as shown in Figure 7 . On the other hand, they also a¤ect …rms' wealth and therefore employment for a given level of cash. This heterogeneity of wealth generates noise that dampens the correlation. These two elements can explain why the unconditional correlation of cash and labor is negative, but low.
We now show that the credit constraint a¤ects the correlation between the cash ratio and employment through the size e¤ect. To do so, we consider two groups of …rms di¤ering with their value of i , namely …rms with strong …nancial constraints and …rms with milder …nancial constraints. In order to be consistent with the calibration strategy described above, we set the two values of i in order to match moments of the debt-to-sales ratio. More precisely, we match the value of this ratio for the bottom and top 25% of the distribution. This strategy implies that …nancially-constrained …rms are those with i = (0:06 r) while less constrained …rms have i = (0:31 r). The lower panel in Table 2 displays the results. In the data, we …nd that …rms with the lowest debt-to-sales ratio exhibit a less negative correlation between the cash ratio and labor. 24 Our model is able to reproduce this fact. Precisely, we …nd that the correlation between the cash ratio and labor is 0:08 for …rms with a low value of i while it is 0:20 for …rms with a large value of i . Therefore, the simulation results reveal that the correlation between cash and labor is stronger for less …nancially-constrained …rms. Those …rms have a larger …nancial multiplier since they have more resources through their level of borrowing. Consequently, their labor is less sensitive to productivity and liquidity shocks, while their cash ratio is not a¤ected by the level of i . This implies that the correlation between cash and labor is larger for a large i .
Extensions
The benchmark model has abstracted from several elements that could be relevant to the analysis. In this section we describe several extensions. First, we examine how results are a¤ected when capital depreciates gradually and the production function has a more general CES form. Second, we analyze the case where …rms are not credit constrained. Third, we discuss the impact of liquidity uncertainty with unanticipated liquidity shocks. Fourth, we discuss the impact of unexpected productivity shocks that provide an alternative explanation for the negative co-movement between cash and employment.
Partial Capital Depreciation and CES Production Function
In the baseline analysis, we assumed that capital depreciated completely from one period to the other and we adopted a Cobb-Douglas production function. Here we relax these two assumptions by allowing capital to depreciate only partially and the production function to follow a more general CES speci…cation where
Introducing partial depreciation a¤ects the beginning-of-period budget constraint, which now becomes:
where 0 < < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital. This changes the …rms' optimization and the computation of the equilibrium wage (see Appendix E).
We consider the baseline calibration discussed in Section 4.2 except that = 0:1, implying an annual capital depreciation rate of 10%, b is normalized to unity and = 0:25, meaning that the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is set to 0:8 (instead of 1 for the Cobb-Douglas speci…cation). Figure 8 shows that our results are robust to the partial depreciation and the CES production function.
[ insert Figure 8 here ] Speci…cally, liquidity and technology shocks generate a negative comovement between labor and the cash ratio while the standard credit shock does not. It is worth noticing that imperfect substitutability between capital and labor helps to generate the negative comovement in response to a technology shock since it reinforces the drop in capital. Using our benchmark calibration, we …nd that the cross-section correlation is 0:10. 25 In order to ensure that the average cash ratio is consistent with the data, we reduced the range of values for the idiosyncratic liquidity shock, such that it 2 [0:55; 0:59]. We still consider 10 equidistant realizations of this shock.
Unconstrained Firms
We assumed so far that r < 1= , so that …rms are always credit-constrained. This has two advantages: it enables us to examine the e¤ect of a standard credit shock and it helps sustain an equilibrium with heterogeneous …rms. It is however important to examine how this assumption a¤ects the response of the economy to liquidity and productivity shocks. We show that in the absence of credit constraints, a liquidity shock a¤ects essentially the cash ratio while a productivity shock a¤ects essentially labor. Cash and labor are thus more disconnected than in the benchmark constrained case.
In order to simulate the unconstrained case, we set r equal to 1= and assume that is su¢ ciently high so that …rms never hit their credit limit. We otherwise use the same calibration as in the benchmark model. Since r = 1= , the level of wealth is undetermined in the steady state. For comparison purposes, we set the initial level of to the same level as in the benchmark steady state. Figure 9 shows the simulation results.
[ insert Figure 9 here ] Following a negative liquidity shock, the economy experiences a decrease in employment and an increase in the cash ratio as in the benchmark. Indeed, on the one hand, …rms need more cash to produce. On the other hand, as cash is costly, labor becomes less productive, so the demand for labor and the equilibrium wage decrease. Notice, however, that the e¤ect on employment and the wage is much milder when …rms are unconstrained as compared to the benchmark, where …rms are constrained. Indeed, as long as the cost of liquidity 1 is not too high, the liquidity shock barely a¤ects labor productivity. Therefore, in the absence of constraint, …rms do not change their labor demand dramatically. In the presence of credit constraints, the demand for labor and hence the equilibrium wage depend on …rms'resources. Since fewer external resources are available, …rms have to cut on labor hiring, generating a stronger reaction of labor demand.
Consider now the e¤ect of a negative productivity shock. While employment decreases as in the benchmark, the cash ratio remains constant. Indeed, the productivity shock has a direct negative e¤ect on the availability of external liquidity, but it has also a negative indirect, general equilibrium e¤ect on the wage and hence on liquidity needs. In the absence of credit constraints, the equilibrium wage is more sensitive to productivity as compared to the case with credit constraints, where labor demand and the wage depend on wealth. Since, in the latter case, the response of aggregate wealth is sluggish, then so are the responses of labor and the wage. Finally, since the wage, and hence liquidity needs, decrease more when …rms are unconstrained, the increase in the cash ratio is mitigated as compared to the benchmark. Actually, the decrease in liquidity needs perfectly compensates for the decrease in external liquidity, leaving the cash ratio unchanged.
Liquidity Uncertainty
In our analysis, …rms know perfectly the amount of external liquidity they can get at the end-of-period, i.e., it is known at beginning-of-period t. If instead we assume that only the distribution of it is known, we can analyze the impact of an increase in uncertainty in it . Not surprisingly, an increase in liquidity uncertainty increases the demand for cash and decreases employment on average. 26 In particular, if we assume that labor is set at the beginning of period, then an increase in uncertainty has the same e¤ect as an anticipated negative liquidity shock. To understand this result, consider the simple case where there are two possible states for it :
The magnitude of $ t , and thus the variance of it , is known at the beginning of period but it is revealed only at the end of period. When $ t increases, the …rm increases its cash holdings. When labor is predetermined, …rms actually hold just enough cash to be able to …nance the wage bill in the worst case where it = L t . The reason is that insu¢ cient cash would leave the …rm with no revenues ( it+1 = 0). 27 This prospect deters …rms from putting themselves in such a situation, as the utility is logarithmic and log(0) = 1. In the event where it = H t , …rms do not draw down on the whole line of credit as it is costly ( > 1), and they set L it = L t Y it . Thus, cash holdings move proportionately to $ t and …rms behave exactly as if their anticipated liquidity shock was L t . 26 This hoarding behavior is reminiscent of the literature on precautionary savings initiated by Bewley (1986) and Aiyagari (1994) . 27 This implicitly assumes that the punishment the …rms face for not honoring the contract entails both that households do not work and that money holdings are seized, leaving the …rms. This also supposes that money is a perfectly pledgable asset and that households are credible enough to implement that punishment.
Unanticipated Productivity Shocks
In this paper we focus on active liquidity management by …rms, i.e., the optimal choice of cash holdings M it . However, a proportion of cash holding may come from unexpected unused cash f M it , which has been equal to zero so far in our analysis. This may give an alternative explanation to the negative comovement between cash and employment. Assume that productivity shocks are not known at beginning-ofperiod t and that …rms can adjust their employment within the end-of-period (i.e., employment is not predetermined as in 6.2). In that case, unused cash f M it is no longer necessarily equal to zero. For example, an unexpected decline in A t implies a lower need for liquidity and thus higher f M it . Thus, we would have a negative comovement between unexpected cash holding f M it and labor demand. However, if the productivity shock is persistent (e.g., as in (2)) the path of productivity in subsequent periods is anticipated as in our benchmark analysis. Overall, except for the e¤ect on impact, the dynamic e¤ect of an unanticipated productivity shock is similar to an anticipated productivity shock.
The model therefore predicts a temporary increase in relative cash holdings. After an initial negative shock, the cash ratio is reduced to adjust for lower expected productivity. In contrast, it is sometimes argued, especially in the wake of the …nancial crisis, that …rms keep holding cash because of low investment opportunities. For this argument to hold in our model, we should assume repeated negative productivity shocks. Alternatively, we would need to add some adjustment costs for reducing money holdings or assume that …rms'liquidity management is totally passive, i.e., …rms would not choose their optimal level of M it .
Conclusion
This paper has documented a negative comovement between the corporate cash ratio and employment. Even though such a relationship may appear surprising at …rst sight, we show that it can be explained both by liquidity and productivity shocks. Precisely, these two shocks might make production less attractive or more di¢ cult to …nance, while they also generate a need for liquidity necessary to pay wage bills, which can be satis…ed by holding more cash. Moreover, we argue that our analysis is useful in understanding the motives for …rms'cash holdings and in shedding light on the dominant shocks during the …nancial crisis.
Besides explaining an interesting stylized fact, the simple model developed in this paper could be extended to analyze the role of corporate liquidity in a macroeconomic environment. Several extensions could be of interest. First, instead of focusing on the business cycle frequency, the model could be used to examine longer term developments. The model would actually be consistent with the documented gradual increase in cash holdings if we assume changes in the production process that imply more end-of-period payments (e.g., with more extensive use of justin-time technologies as reported in Gao, 2013, or with an increase in production outsourcing). A second extension, that would lead to a richer analysis, is to introduce …nancial intermediaries. Third, for a better analysis of the …nancial crisis, it would be of interest to introduce demand shocks. Finally, the role of policy intervention would be a natural extension. The last two extensions would be related to the existing DSGE literature incorporating working capital to study monetary policy.
and that r t > > 1, thenM it = 0, M t > 0 and L it = it Y it . 29 The Lagrangian problem is then
The entrepreneur's program yields the following …rst-order conditions with respect to c it , D it and M it :
Combining (21) and (22) give the standard Euler equation: 28 We show later that this guess is satis…ed and we will specify k(:). 29 This can be shown analytically but is not done here for parsimony.M t = 0 holds whenever > 1: the …rm draws on all its internal liquidity before relying to any external liquidity, because external liquidity is relatively costly. When w t > A it f [k(w t ; A it )], the …rm has liquidity needs that it satis…es by using both internal liquidity (M t > 0) and external liquidity (L t > 0). As long as < r t , the …rm uses as much external liquidity as possible, so
The optimality conditions with respect to l it and K it are:
Replacing it = it in (25) and combing with (26), we obtain:
F has constant returns to scale so we can write: F (K; Al) = Alf (K=Al). Therefore,
Since F is concave in both arguments, we have f 00 < 0, which implies thatw(k) is strictly increasing in k. If there exists a solution k(w t ; A it ) to that equation, then this solution is unique and satis…es k(w t ; A it ) = A itw 1 (w t =A it ). As a result, we have:
where k(w; A) = Aw 1 (w=A).
Consider the CES production function
In that case, the capital-labor ratio is given by:
In the Leontief case where F (K; Al) = min fbK; Alg, we simply have: k it = A it =b. In the Cobb-Douglas case where
Combining (22), (25) and it = it , we get:
is the return of one unit of hired labor. This means that the constraint is binding whenever w > w. For the CES production function, we have:
. The Cobb-Douglas case is obtained simply by setting = 0.
Log-utility
Lemma 1 When u(c it ) = ln(c it ), we have c it = (1 ) it .
Proof. We make the educated guess that there exists such that c it = (1 ) it . Given that shocks are known at the beginning-of-period, c it+1 = it+1 is known at the beginning-of-period, so the Euler equation (22) can be written without the expectations operator 1
Combining our guess with (3), (11) and (10), we obtain
Similarly, combining (22) , (25), (26) and it = it , we get:
If the constraint is not binding, then
Replacing in it+1 , we obtain that it+1 = r t it . Replacing it+1 in the Euler equation where t+1 = 0, we …nd = .
If the constraint is binding, then D it = it Y it , which implies that
Replacing it+1 and it in the Euler equation, and then replacing l it , we …nd again that = .
Combining c it = (1 ) it with the binding constraints (3), (5) and (8), we can easily derive equations (13)- (17) in Proposition 1. The Cobb-Douglas case is obtained by using Equation (10) .
B The Household Problem
Identical households have a linear utility U t with a discount factor h , and no …nancial frictions:
with h . The households maximize this utility subject to their beginning-ofperiod and end-of-period budget constraints
where c h is households'consumption, D h is household debt, M h are the household's beginning-of-period money holdings,M h are the household's end-of-period money holdings. r M is the return of 1 unit of cash. In the end-of-period, the households lend or spend (depending of the interpretation of the liquidity shock) part of their wage w t l t to the …rms. This lending/spending L t incurs costs 1 to the households and yields r M . can be interpreted as a real sunk cost. r L can be interpreted as the equilibrium return on short-term lending or as an equilibrium price premium on early sales. Consolidating the end-of-period t 1 and the beginning-of-period t budget constraints, we obtain:
Households'optimization then implies that, in equilibrium, r t = 1= h , r M t = 1, r L t = and l t = (w t = w) .
C Equilibrium with aggregate shocks only
Before proving Proposition 2, we establish the following Lemma:
Lemma 2 There exists an increasing function so that w t < w (A t ; t ; t ; w t ) is equivalent to t < (A t ; t ; t ). If t < (A t ; t ; t ), then the credit constraint is binding and the dynamics of K t , M t , D t , l t and t+1 follow:
is the …nancial multiplier and
is the equilibrium wage so that w(A t ; t ; t ; t ) is the solution to l s (w t ) = Z(w t ; A t ; t ; t ) r t t .
Proof. w is given by Equation (29) . Given thatF l (:) and k(:) are increasing functions, w is increasing in w t . Since we also have that the constrained equilibrium wage w is increasing in t , then there exists an increasing function so that w t < w (A t ; t ; t ; w t ) is equivalent to t < (A t ; t ; t ). The rest of the Lemma derives from Proposition 1.
Using this Lemma, we can study the steady state. From Equation (35), we have that the steady-state wage must satisfy:
Rearranging:
As long as (1 )(1 ) > , the left-hand-side is strictly negative if and only if
Besides, combining (24) , (25) and t = t , and applying the Euler theorem, we get:
Therefore, the credit constraint is binding in the steady state ( > 0) whenever h > . This proves Proposition 2.
D Numerical method
The algorithm to compute the steady-state distribution of …rms is as follows:
1. We …rst choose a grid of wealth it . Our grid is a 1000-value grid over [0; 0:9]. We use the Chebychev nodes to make the grid more concentrated on low values of .
2. We allocate an initial uniform and independent distribution to the values of i0 , i0 and A i0 , and make an initial guess on the equilibrium wage w 0 .
3. Given the initial distribution on it , it and A it and the initial equilibrium wage w 0 , we use Proposition 1 and the Markov Chain to compute the new distribution of it+1 , it+1 and A it+1 . Using Proposition 1, we compute the corresponding distribution of labor demand l it+1 . We aggregate this labor demand l t+1 = P i l it+1 di, and if l t+1 > l s (w t ) (if l t+1 < l s (w t )), then we update the equilibrium wage w t+1 upward (downward).
4. We repeat step 3 until the equilibrium wage is reached, i.e. when aggregate labor demand is fully satis…ed.
E Partial capital depreciation and more general production function
The optimality condition with respect to l it is unchanged, while the optimality condition with respect to K it is now:
Replacing it = it in (25) and combining with (36), we obtain:
, and c it = (1 ) it , we obtain, using the policy function for it+1 (17) and the de…nition of Z it (18):
Therefore, k it , the solution to this implicit equation, now depends not only on w t but also on r t , A it , it and it . Notes: In both panels, the empirical correlation between m and`is computed after removing the …rm-speci…c linear trend. In the lower panel, this empirical correlation is computed for two groups of …rms. In the …rst (second, resp.) line, we select the 25 percent of …rms with the lowest (highest, resp.) average debt-to-sales ratio. From the model, we set the share of output collateral, i , to 0:06 r (…rst group) and 0:31 r (second group). Note: The solid (dashed, resp.) line corresponds to the cash ratio for …rms with labor share below (above, resp.) the median. The labor share is industry-speci…c and it is computed as the ratio between payroll and production. 
